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I. INTRODUCTION

For the last decade, voting rights across America have contracted. 1
Using new legislation that “range[s] from strict photo ID requirements to
early voting cutbacks to registration restrictions,” fully half of the states
have implemented restrictions on the franchise since 2010. 2 The trend was
* My sincere thanks to the University of Akron School of Law for hosting this wonderful event, and
to Professor Tracy Thomas, the John F. Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law and Director of the
Constitutional Law Center, for inviting me to participate. And thank you to my wife Emily and
daughters Lula and Heidi, who inspire me every day to be a better teacher, scholar, and person.
1. In the 2018 election, “voters in at least eight states [faced] more stringent voting laws than
they did in the last federal election cycle in 2016. Voters in 23 states [faced] tougher restrictions than
they did in 2010. The most common restrictions involve[d] voter ID laws, but they also include[d]
additional burdens on registration, cutbacks to early voting and absentee voting, and reduced voting
access for people with past criminal convictions.” Wendy Weiser & Max Feldman, The State of Voting
CTR.
FOR
JUST.,
June
5,
2018,
at
5,
2018,
BRENNAN
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_State_of_Voting_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VGC-NF63].
2. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., New Voting Restrictions in America, July 3, 2019, at 1,
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/New%20Voting%20Restrictions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3UQ8-A7K6] (“Overall, 25 states have put in place new restrictions since then —
15 states have more restrictive voter ID laws in place (including six states with strict photo ID
requirements), 12 have laws making it harder for citizens to register (and stay registered), ten made it
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exacerbated when, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court found
the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula unconstitutional, thereby
gutting the preclearance system that required states with a history of
discriminatory voting laws to seek preapproval for voting rule changes
that could affect minorities. 3 In Shelby’s aftermath, several states
previously subject to preclearance began aggressively purging names
from their voter rolls. 4 Add in the Supreme Court’s recent finding that
extreme partisan gerrymandering—which has been tied to legislative
stagnation, political dysfunction, and vast underrepresentation for citizens
living within voting districts that legislators have packed and cracked5—
is a non-justiciable political question, 6 and the picture of voting rights in
America seems quite bleak.
On the 100th anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment’s passage,
and with the 2020 election looming, trends that contract voting rights must
be combated wherever possible. This Article considers one particularly
ripe opportunity: felony disenfranchisement laws. The Nineteenth
Amendment and the history of the women’s suffrage movement can offer
a compelling argument against such laws. The exposure of flaws in the
logic behind efforts to preclude classes of citizens from choosing our next
political leaders can offer persuasive reasons to end felony
disenfranchisement in America today.
Across the country, felony disenfranchisement laws leave some six
million citizens unable to vote. 7 They do not simply restrict voting for
those currently imprisoned; as of 2018, 4.7 million citizens could not vote
because they lived in one of 34 states that prohibited the franchise for a
mix of those on probation, parole, or even those who completed their
more difficult to vote early or absentee, and three took action to make it harder to restore voting rights
for people with past criminal convictions.”).
3. Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 550–57 (2013).
4. “For the two election cycles between 2012 and 2016, jurisdictions no longer subject to
federal preclearance had purge rates significantly higher than jurisdictions that did not have it in 2013.
The Brennan Center calculates that 2 million fewer voters would have been purged over those four
years if jurisdictions previously subject to federal preclearance had purged at the same rate as those
jurisdictions not subject to that provision in 2013.” Jonathan Brater et al., Purges: A Growing Threat
to the Right to Vote, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., July 20, 2018, at 1,
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Purges_Growing_Threat.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ZHY-59TP].
5. See Michael Gentithes, Gobbledygook: Political Questions, Manageability, & Partisan
Gerrymandering, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming).
6. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (“We conclude that partisan
gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”).
7. Morgan McLeod, Expanding the Vote: Two Decades of Felony Disenfranchisement
Reform, SENTENCING PROJECT, Oct. 17, 2018, at 3, https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/Expanding-the-Vote-1997-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAD5-S37G].
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sentence. 8 In twelve states that restrict voting rights for the latter category,
citizens who were convicted but already served their time “make up over
50 percent of the entire disenfranchised population.” 9 And because most
felony disenfranchisement laws apply irrespective of offense type,10 many
of these citizens lose the vote for committing crimes wholly unrelated to
the political process—a sanction that can follow them for a lifetime
outside the prison’s walls.
Though felony disenfranchisement laws have an outsized effect on
young minority men, they increasingly threaten a century of gains in
female enfranchisement. In the last quarter-century, rates of female
incarceration have exploded. Since 1980, the growth rate for female
imprisonment has more than doubled that of men, leading to a total
increase of more than 750% by 2017. 11 Today, more than 225,000 women
are behind bars in prisons and jails, representing approximately one-tenth
of the total number of incarcerated Americans.12 When those on probation
or parole are included, women constitute nearly one-fifth of the total
corrections population in the United States. 13
This growth in the female incarceration rate has caused rapid
disenfranchisement for female felons under state law. Research suggests
that approximately one million women are disenfranchised under current
felon disenfranchisement legislation, 14 a number poised to grow as the
proportion of women in the nation’s corrections population increases over
time. 15 Furthermore, women are more likely than men to be imprisoned
8. Id.
9. Jean Chung, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer, SENTENCING PROJECT, June 27, 2019,
at 2, https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Felony-DisenfranchisementPrimer.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7UU-EMVX].
10. See, e.g., O.R.C. § 2961.01(A)(1).
11. SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED WOMEN AND GIRLS, June 6, 2019, at 1,
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Incarcerated-Women-and-Girls.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KV6J-3NNE].
12. By the end of 2017, federal and state correctional authorities held approximately 1,378,000
male prisoners and 111,000 female prisoners. Jennifer Bronson & E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2017,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, April 2019, at 3, tbl. 1,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JYQ-4Z2W]. Additionally, county
and city jails held roughly 632,000 male inmates and 114,000 female inmates. Zhen Zeng, Jail
Inmates in 2017, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, April 2019, at 5,
tbl. 3, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji17.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E9L-Y8DE]; see also
SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 11.
13. E-mail from Morgan McLeod, Communications Director, Sentencing Project, to Michael
Gentithes, Assistant Professor, University of Akron School of Law (March 29, 2019 11:56 AM) (copy
on file with Professor Gentithes).
14. Id.
15. “If these trends continue, we will see more and more women who lose the right to vote in
addition to other rights/privileges that are lost with a felony conviction. . . . The tendency is to put a
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for drug or property offenses. 16 Thus, an increasing number of women are
losing their ability to vote based upon non-violent offenses with no
relationship whatsoever to politics or government.
Today’s arguments in support of felony disenfranchisement laws
bear striking similarities to the arguments of anti-suffragists more than a
century earlier. Both suggest that a traditionally subordinated class of
citizens is inherently incapable of bearing the responsibility that the right
to vote entails. 17 Both argue that some potential votes are somehow less
worthy than others, and thus the authors of those votes ought to be
excluded from the marketplace of political ideas. And both assert a
distinction between the votes of some citizens thought to be of higher
political value, and those thought unworthy of having their voices counted
in the political arena.
This Article examines the historical response to those arguments and
suggests that they can be applied forcefully in the contemporary debate
over felony disenfranchisement. Suffragists raised two arguments in
response to coverture-based contentions against women enfranchisement:
first, that men simply did not represent women’s interests in politics,
instead subordinating them ever further both in family structures and the
public sphere; and second, that women had something important to add to
the political conversation that would be missing as long as they were
excluded from the debate. Similarly, felony disenfranchisement laws are
based upon the fiction that there is a distinction between good votes of
most citizens and bad votes of criminals, and therefore excluding former
felons’ voices from the political arena is acceptable because their interests
will be sufficiently served by the good votes of others. But the voices of
former felons should be heard, both because of the perspective those
voices will bring to modern problems caused by growing incarceration
rates, and because those voices may add important and worthy ideas to
the political marketplace that would be absent if their contributions are
excluded.

male face on the issue, but it impacts women and children at alarmingly high rates.” Melanie
Mignucci, Why Felon Disenfranchisement is a Feminist Issue, BUSTLE, Aug. 18, 2017,
https://www.bustle.com/p/why-felon-disenfranchisement-is-a-feminist-issue-77456
[https://perma.cc/S423-AZ2L].
16. “Twenty-five percent of women in prison have been convicted of a drug offense, compared
to 14% of men in prison; 26% of incarcerated women have been convicted of a property crime,
compared to 17% among incarcerated men” SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 11, at 4.
17. See Reva Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 979 (2002) (citations omitted); see also infra notes 19–24
and accompanying text.
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The Article begins with a brief introduction to anti-suffragist rhetoric
and the common arguments suffragists raised in response. It then turns to
the modern felony disenfranchisement debate, noting the parallels
between coverture-based anti-suffragist rhetoric and modern support for
the civil death of felons. The Article then concludes by suggesting that
historical suffragist arguments can be tapped to forcefully respond to
felony disenfranchisement proposals.
II. ANTI-SUFFRAGIST RHETORIC & SUFFRAGIST RESPONSES
The trends in female felon disenfranchisement are especially
incongruous with the Nineteenth Amendment’s history. The Amendment
was the culmination of an historical shift in the way our nation understood
the importance of voting rights in representative democracy. The response
of suffragists to anti-suffragist rhetoric dramatically illustrates this
evolution in modern American thinking.
Arguments to disenfranchise subsets of the population sound in
paternalism: some citizens simply cannot be trusted to exercise the vote
responsibly. Frederick Douglas quipped that depriving some citizens of
suffrage “affirm[s their] incapacity to form intelligent judgments
respecting public measures,” thereby “brand[ing them] with the stigma of
inferiority.” 18 In opposition to the Nineteenth Amendment, antisuffragists “routinely emphasized that women were especially suited and
exclusively destined for the work of family maintenance.” 19 Antisuffragists contended that “women lacked the capacity for managing
public affairs, and the very effort would distract them from their
obligations as wives and mothers.” 20 This view reflected the views
attributed to many of the founding fathers of the Constitution, who
believed that “only citizens who had the requisite degree of independence
to vote their own judgment, rather than the interests of those to whom they
might be beholden, had the capacity to exercise the franchise
responsibly.” 21
The Nineteenth Amendment, and the suffragist movement
supporting it, represented a profound reaction against such thinking.
Suffragists challenged the idea that male voters in the household could
sufficiently protect the interests of the women in their homes. That idea
18. Frederick Douglass, What Negroes Want, in 4 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK
DOUGLASS 159–60 (Phillip S. Foner ed., 1955) (quoted in Eli L. Levine, Does the Social Contract
Justify Felony Disenfranchisement?, 1 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 193, 195 (2009)).
19. Siegel, supra note 17 (citations omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 980.
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grew from the legal tradition of coverture, under which a married
women’s rights were subsumed by her husband’s, making them a single
person in the eyes of the law. 22 Suffragists rejected the fiction of
coverture, arguing instead that “women had a right to direct relations with
the state, independent of their mate or brood.” 23 According to suffragists,
“men could not and did not represent women. Suffragists drove this point
home by pointing to women’s subordination in the family and the market
and asserting that the record uniformly demonstrated men’s incapacity to
represent fully and fairly women’s interests.” 24
Suffragists, especially in the movement’s early years, also
emphasized the fundamentality of the right to vote for all citizens.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s 1848 “Declaration of Sentiments and
Resolutions” expressed “as its central idea protest against the denial to
women of ‘this ﬁrst right of a citizen, the elective franchise, thereby
leaving her without representation in the halls of legislation, . . . oppressed
on all sides.’” 25 Some twenty years later, Stanton elaborated that “suffrage
is a natural right—as necessary to man under government, for the
protection of person and property, as are air and motion to life,” and thus
suffragists would “point out the tyranny of every qualiﬁcation to the free
exercise of this sacred right.” 26 In her 1872 trial for attempting to vote,
Susan B. Anthony testified that “‘[y]our denial of my citizen’s right to
vote is the denial of my consent as one of the governed, the denial of my
right of representation as one of the taxed . . . therefore the denial of my
sacred right to life, liberty, and property.’” 27 Suffragists thus exposed the
factual inaccuracy and moral incoherence of anti-suffragist’s paternalistic
arguments. 28

22. As Justice Black quipped, the rule of coverture “worked out in reality to mean that though
the husband and wife are one, the one is the husband.” United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361
(1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
23. Siegel, supra note 17, at 987 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 991.
25. ELLEN CARROL DUBOIS, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 85 (1988).
26. Id. at 91 (citing HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, vol. II: 1861–1878, 185 (Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, eds., 1881)).
27. Levine, supra note 18, at 194 (quoting JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED
OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3 (2006) (quoting The Trial of
Susan B. Anthony, in THE STRUGGLE FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS: THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL
SOURCES 133 (George Klosko & Margaret G. Klosko eds., 1999))).
28. Not all suffragist arguments emphasized the commonality of men and woman and the
universality of the right to vote. For instance, as Ellen Carol DuBois has noted, in the wake of the
Fifteenth Amendment’s passage suffragists began to argue that women should have to vote to ensure
that a distinctly female perspective on morality and politics entered the public sphere. See DUBOIS,
supra note 25, at 94–98.
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III. THE FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT DEBATE
The history of felony disenfranchisement has many parallels to the
history of female disenfranchisement. Felony disenfranchisement has its
roots in ancient Greek and Roman society, where criminals were denied
the right to vote, along with many other civil rights and privileges. 29
Felony disenfranchisement took hold in colonial America as well, where
colonists precluded former criminals from voting, 30 though often only for
“certain offenses related to voting or considered egregious violations of
the moral code.” 31 In the first 50 years after independence, “eleven states
eliminated voting rights for specified crimes thought to have some
relationship to the electoral process.” 32 Over time, however, more and
more states passed disenfranchisement laws applicable to all felons,
irrespective of the nature of the underlying crime. “By 1868, twenty-nine
states enshrined some language into their constitution depriving felons of
voting rights.” 33 Southern states in particular “tailored their
disenfranchisement laws in order to bar black male voters, targeting those
offenses believed to be committed most frequently by the black
population.” 34
Modern arguments in favor of felony disenfranchisement also take
on a paternalistic tone. They offer an added avenue, aside from
incarceration itself, through which lawmakers can prevent a selected
group of individuals from harming society—though the alleged harm, the
election of undesirable political leaders, is not itself an illegal result. 35 For
example, such arguments featured prominently in the opposition to a 2002
Senate bill that would have secured federal voting rights for ex-felons.
Senator Mitch McConnell “warned of terrorists, rapists, and murderers
voting, and of jailhouse blocs banding together to oust sheriffs and toughon-crime government officials.” 36 Then-Senator Jeff Sessions argued
“that a person who violates serious laws of a State or the Federal

29. Levine, supra note 18, at 196–97.
30. Id. at 197 (summarizing criminal disenfranchisement laws in the colonies of Virginia,
Maryland, Plymouth, Connecticut, and Rhode Island).
31. Chung, supra note 9, at 3.
32. Levine, supra note 18, at 197–98. However, Levine also notes that “many states also
disenfranchised for other crimes not related to the electoral process.”
33. Id. at 198.
34. Chung, supra note 9, at 3.
35. “Outside of incarceration, disenfranchisement can be seen as a supplementary form of
incapacitation; by preventing criminals from participating in the democratic process
disenfranchisement laws stopped criminals from further harming society.” Levine, supra note 18, at
215.
36. Id. at 212.
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Government forfeits their right to participate in those activities of that
government [because] their judgement and character is such that they
ought not to be making decisions on the most important issues facing our
country.” 37 Senator George Allen also took to the floor to argue against
the amendment, which would allow a former felon to “feel like a fullfledged citizen again,” on State’s rights grounds. 38
Similar arguments arose regarding Florida’s recent ballot proposal,
Amendment 4, which was to restore the right to vote for most Floridians
with prior felony convictions. Under Amendment 4, those convicted of a
felony other than murder or a sexual offense would have their voting
rights “restored upon completion of all terms of sentence including parole
or probation.” 39 In the public debate about Amendment 4, critics again
suggesting that former felons could not, in general, be trusted to
responsibly exercise their voting rights. Some argued that felons should
only be permitted the right to vote once they have proved to be a “valuable
member of society” worthy of the public’s trust to exercise that right
responsibly. 40
In making such claims, critics of Amendment 4 contended that a
specific group of citizens—in this case, convicted felons—cannot
responsibly exercise the franchise. But because voting poorly is not itself
illegal, the argument also requires an accusation that convicted felons are,
in some sense, lesser. Supporters of felony disenfranchisement thus
suggest that until proven otherwise, felons are not full-fledged citizens
permitted to exercise their full panoply of civil rights. While society might
be prepared to tolerate the poor political choices of such full-fledged
citizens, it cannot (and should not) withstand the political mistakes likely
to be made by convicted felons.
In November of 2018, Florida’s Amendment 4 by referendum passed
with a 63% majority vote. 41 Proponents hailed the Amendment’s passage
as a landmark moment for voting rights; the estimated 1.4 million
Floridians set to gain renewed access to the ballot box under the
Amendment would represent the largest expansion in the franchise since
37. 148 CONG. REC. S 802 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002).
38. Levine, supra note 18, at 212 (citing 148 CONG. REC. S 802 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002)).
39. FLA. CONST. amend. 4.
40. James Call, Amendment 4: Restoring felons’ voting rights is hardball politics or the right
thing to do, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.tallahassee.com/
story/news/2018/10/30/amendment-4-florida-2018-debate-hardball-politics-versus-rightdo/1822919002/ [https://perma.cc/SZ99-VYLL] (quoting lobbyist Barney Bishop).
41. Alejandro De La Garza, “Our Voice Will Count.” Former Felon Praises Florida Passing
Amendment 4, Which Will Restore Voting Rights to 1.4 Million People, TIME (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://time.com/5447051/florida-amendment-4-felon-voting/ [https://perma.cc/M2QM-RUPD].
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the passage of the Voting Rights Act. 42 More than 400,000 of those whose
voting rights the Amendment would restore are African American. 43
Howard Simon, the executive director of the ACLU of Florida, remarked
that Amendment 4’s passage meant “[w]e will no longer have second
class citizens” in the state of Florida. 44
Despite the optimism at the time of its passage, Amendment 4’s
future today is clouded. After Amendment 4 passed by referendum,
Republican lawmakers in both houses of the Florida Legislature passed a
bill which “specified that a felony sentence is not complete, and therefore
a felon not eligible to vote, until all fines, fees and restitution are paid in
full.” 45 Because many former felons struggle to find stable employment
and steady income after their release, the legislation would prevent a
substantial portion of them from claiming the renewed voting rights that
Amendment 4 appeared to promise. 46 Some estimates suggest the new
legislation may preclude as many as half of those potentially granted
voting rights under Amendment 4 from regaining the franchise. 47
Supporters of the legislation claimed that it was a necessary
clarification to Amendment 4, which did not define what, if any, financial
obligations felons must meet to “complet[e] all terms of sentence” and
trigger the restoration of voting rights. 48 But in ongoing litigation in
several Florida courts, Amendment 4’s proponents claim that this

42. Id.
43. German Lopez, Florida Votes to Restore Ex-Felon Voting Rights with Amendment 4, VOX
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/6/18052374/florida-amendment4-felon-voting-rights-results [https://perma.cc/D38F-SV2X].
44. Garza, supra note 41.
45. Sue Carlton, The Florida governor’s bold move on Amendment 4. Or is that against
Amendment 4?, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/
columns/the-florida-governors-bold-move-on-amendment-4-or-is-that-against-amendment-420190814/ [https://perma.cc/U789-LXAM].
46. Id.
47. “Estimates have suggested that more than half a million people will be affected by the new
financial obligation-paying requirement, and many will need to wait years to finish payments before
they can vote. Others may never be able to clear their debts, meaning that they will be permanently
disenfranchised.” P.R. Lockhart, Florida faces an intense legal battle over restoring former felons’
(July
2,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andvoting
rights,
VOX
politics/2019/7/2/20677955/amendment-4-florida-felon-voting-rights-lawsuits-fines-fees
[https://perma.cc/7L8A-4JB5].
48. “‘If it’s not defined, we leave it to the judge, the government to discriminate on a case-bycase basis and I think that’s a recipe for rampant discrimination,’ said Rep. James Grant, a Tampa
Republican, who championed the bill and is the chairman of the House Criminal Justice Committee.”
Tyler Kendall, Felons in Florida Won Back Their Right to Vote. Now a New Bill Might Limit Who
Can Cast a Ballot, CBS NEWS (May 23, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/florida-felons-wonback-right-to-vote-new-bill-might-limit-who-can-cast-ballot-2019-05-23/ [https://perma.cc/7WNEY9MV].
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additional legislation is merely an effort to put another roadblock in front
of felons seeking rehabilitation and reassimilation in society. According
to the lawsuits, the Florida Legislature has unconstitutionally
disenfranchised poor and minority citizens with felony records, denying
them the rights restored by Amendment 4. 49 One lawsuit filed by the
ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the
Brennan Center for Justice argues that the new law will create two classes
of former felons, allowing only those deemed worthy by their financial
wherewithal to exercise their right to vote. 50 These lawsuits thus equate
the new legislation to a modern poll tax, under which citizens of lower
socio-economic classes are prohibited from exercising their voting
rights. 51
IV. PARALLEL RETORTS
If these arguments sound familiar, they should. The debate over
legislation to limit Amendment 4’s reach is yet another modern echo of
the debates around women’s suffrage. Politicians acting to limit felon
voting rights use a familiar divide-and-conquer strategy, suggesting that a
traditionally subordinate group of citizens is not entitled to automatic trust
to exercise their voting rights responsibly. In contrast, those in favor of
restoring felon’s voting rights note that former felons stand ready and
willing to participate in the public political debate, where they might
exercise that power to ensure that under-represented groups have their
voices heard in the modern political discourse.
The same strands of argument arose when opponents of the
Nineteenth Amendment subtly denigrated female voters as incapable of
voting responsibly, or when anti-suffragists suggested that female citizens
belong to a subordinate social class whose poor political choices would
be an unnecessary headwind for society at large. These arguments
similarly proceeded in two parts. First, they distinguished a group of
citizens as lesser and likely to exercise the vote in irresponsible ways.
Second, they maintained that those “poor” voting choices can and should
49. Lockhart, supra note 47 (“This law will disproportionately impact black Floridians with a
felony conviction, who face the intersecting barriers of accessing jobs in a state with long-standing
wealth and employment disparities,” Leah Aden, deputy director of litigation for the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, one of several groups involved in the ACLU lawsuit, explained in a
statement).
50. “The law ‘will have a massive disenfranchising effect, and result in sustained, and likely
permanent, disenfranchisement for individuals without means,’ the lawsuit notes. It adds that the
Florida law ‘creates two classes of returning citizens: those who are wealthy enough to vote and those
who cannot afford to.’” Id.
51. Id.
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be disregarded by the rest of society. Just as Anthony predicted during her
trial, “‘if we once establish the false principle, that United States
citizenship does not carry with it the right to vote in every state in this
Union, there is no end to the petty freaks and cunning devices that will be
resorted to, to exclude one and another class of citizens from the right of
suffrage.’” 52
I do not claim that felony disenfranchisement laws are
unconstitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected arguments that
the denial of the franchise to felons is an Equal Protection violation,
relying in part upon language in Section 2 of the 14th Amendment that
seems to permit disenfranchisement “for participation in rebellion, or
other crime.” 53 But the history of debate over women’s suffrage sheds
light upon the flaws in felony disenfranchisement legislation, both as a
matter of public policy and constitutional rhetoric. Many of the same
retorts used to defeat paternalistic anti-suffragist arguments and usher in
the 19th Amendment can be similarly deployed to undermine paternalistic
arguments to disenfranchise felons. Put another way, the 19th
Amendment’s history can be read synthetically, as part of a dynamic
history that helps ground voting rights claims filed on behalf of the
disenfranchised. Potential voting rights claimants, both in the felony
disenfranchisement space and others, can make their arguments more
forceful and add the weight of history to their claims. What follows is a
demonstration of how that argument might function in cases like those
proceeding against the Florida Legislature’s reaction to Amendment 4,
with a focus on two particularly powerful retorts against those who
suggest felons should not be trusted with the franchise.
A.

Adding Valuable Voices to Our Political Discourse

First, the history of the 19th Amendment explains why higher-class
citizens cannot paternalistically suggest that some groups are inherently
incapable of bearing the responsibility that the fundamental right to vote
entails. That divisive strategy is premised upon a claimed distinction
between the responsible votes of some groups and the irresponsible (and
likely incorrect) votes of others. But American history shows that
distinction to be false.
Our constitutional tradition, informed by the suffragist movement,
demonstrates that there is no cognizable difference between “good” and
52. DUBOIS, supra note 25, at 105 (quoting United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas.
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14, 459)).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41–56 (1974).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 5

442

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[53:431

“bad” votes, or “good” and “bad” voters. Suggestions that some potential
new votes will be misguided, both in the past and present, are a thinlyveiled attempt to ensure the status quo by those who gain the most by it
through their political positions and influence. 54 Their expressed concern
that these new votes may undermine mainstream beliefs is based upon
their fear that a change in such beliefs will mean changes to their current
position of political power. But our constitutional tradition often requires
such changes, first expressed and defended in our political discourse and
then definitively established at the ballot box. Our constitutional tradition,
of which the Nineteenth Amendment is a vibrant component, established
that the right to vote is a fundamental one for all citizens, 55 irrespective of
how they might exercise it, for the very reason that different citizens might
vote in valuably different ways.
The Nineteenth Amendment’s history also illustrates how the
supposedly “bad” votes readily discredited by the politically powerful are
often the product of important and distinct views that are otherwise absent
from our political discourse. Suffragists rightly contended that women
could add ideas to the public debate that men themselves might not,
simply by virtue of their unique, and uniquely powerful, experiences and
abilities. So too might former felons be able to add to present-day political
discussion, bringing ideas and perspectives that the political powerful
seem otherwise likely to overlook.
This is especially true at a moment when the criminal justice reform
movement holds some bipartisan appeal, either as a purely moral matter
or as an economic concern for the efficient use of public resources to
achieve just and equitable results. Though some agreements have been
possible—such as alterations to disparate sentencing laws for drug
offenses involving crack cocaine 56 or sentencing reforms aimed to reduce
recidivism rates amongst former inmates 57—the political will to find
additional areas of agreement for further reform is dwindling. Allowing
felons to participate in that debate holds great promise for breaking the
logjam. No group would be in a better position to highlight the criminal
justice system’s discriminatory flaws and immoral chokepoints than those
who have found themselves inside that system for significant portions of
their lives.

54. 148 CONG. REC. S 802 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002).
55. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
562 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
56. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220 (2010).
57. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-319 (2018).
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Rejecting Efforts to Hinder Expansion of Voting Rights to
Traditionally Subordinated Groups

Second, our history culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment itself
forcefully rejects any legal regime that unnecessarily hinders the
expansion of voting rights to traditionally subordinated groups. Those
groups include the very citizens most in need of a political voice to protect
their civil rights and pursuit of happiness. And just as that need was clear
for female voters during the suffragist movement, it is clear today for
former felons disenfranchised across the country.
Felony disenfranchisement laws are particularly alarming, in light of
the Nineteenth Amendment’s history, given their potential deleterious
effect upon female voting rights. Felony disenfranchisement laws are a
rapidly-growing challenge facing low-income, minority women through
the United States. Thus, these laws create widespread disenfranchisement
of female felons that is offensive to the tradition the Nineteenth
Amendment represents. That is especially true given the reality that, in
most cases of female felon disenfranchisement, the loss of voting rights is
a consequence suffered for a past indiscretion which was entirely
unrelated to politics or the electoral process. Such an unnecessary
reduction in female voting rights is a result that stands as an offense
against the historical struggle that preceded the Nineteenth Amendment’s
enactment.
V. CONCLUSION
Though courts have not traditionally read the Nineteenth
Amendment to have normative implications for areas of law outside of
voting, 58 its implications for voting rights itself can still be tapped,
especially in today’s political debate about contractions in voting rights.
In Reva Seigal’s words, “[w]e invoke the aspirations, values, choices,
commitments, obligations, struggles, errors, injuries, wrongs, and wisdom
of past generations of Americans as we make claims about the
Constitution, and this appeal to the experience and concerns of past
generations of Americans shapes the claims we make on each other about
the Constitution’s meaning in the present.” 59 Today, the Nineteenth
58. “[J]udicial acknowledgment of women’s enfranchisement as a break with traditional
understandings of the family was short-lived. Soon after ratification, the judiciary moved to repress
the structural significance of women’s enfranchisement, by reading the Nineteenth Amendment as a
rule concerning voting that had no normative significance for matters other than the franchise.” Siegel,
supra note 17, at 1012.
59. Id. at 1032.
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Amendment’s significance should be celebrated, not downplayed. And in
the course of that celebration, we should recognize the value that the
history of the movement for women’s suffrage has for legal regimes that
restrict voting rights for disfavored groups, including the millions of
former felons across the country who have been wrongfully
disenfranchised.
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